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Last week I published a new article for the Center for Civic Participation and Democracy in Romania, analyzing the recent NATO Summit in The Hague. Beyond the smiles and symbolism, the summit revealed deep tensions and strategic uncertainty. My piece explores the good, the bad and the “elephant in the room” at the latest NATO Summit. All of this is relevant for anticipating what may come next for the North – Atlantic Alliance.
Since then, Russia has launched a wave of brutal attacks against Ukraine; Putin has made clear that his maximalist objectives in Ukraine are unchanged; the Pentagon abruptly halted already-approved arms shipments to Ukraine and now Donald Trump says US will resume sending weapons. We are nowhere near to a just peace or even a ceasefire, which is not at all surprising, given that Putin was never really willing to stop his aggression against Ukraine. On the contrary.
My Romanian readers can access the original article here: https://civicparticipation.ro/ce-urmeaza-pentru-nato-dupa-summit-ul-de-la-haga/
Here is a translation of the article.
Last year in Washington, NATO leaders were talking about “Trump-proofing” the Alliance, in an effort to shield the Alliance from the potential impact of a Trump victory, given his well-known skepticism towards NATO. One year later, the NATO Summit in The Hague placed the American president at its center. NATO allies managed to win his favor and offered him a political and especially media victory. The summit was shortened and tailored to match Donald Trump’s style, and in the end, everyone breathed a sigh of relief. The event concluded without major incidents, and member states reaffirmed their commitment to Article 5. From that perspective, the summit was a success. But when compared with previous summits and evaluated in the broader context of global threats and uncertainty, it was a mix of achievements and setbacks, of progress and regression.
Let’s take a closer look at both the positive aspects and the controversial ones.
A Summit for Donald Trump?
After Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the main concern among allies was the possibility of the U.S. administration drifting away from NATO by effectively abandoning its Article 5 commitment. That would have gutted the most powerful military alliance in history and had massive geopolitical consequences. Criticism from Washington regarding the level of defense spending by other member states, President Trump’s statements that he would not defend members who “don’t pay,” and the administration’s shift from shared values to transactional realism, all set the stage for a tense summit. Let’s not forget that in 2018 Donald Trump had flirted with the idea of withdrawing the U.S. from NATO, which he deemed “obsolete.” If the goal of this summit was to avoid a rupture with the United States or any unpleasant surprises from President Trump, then it certainly delivered.
The American president himself acknowledged his change of heart in his post-summit remarks:
“As far as Article Five—look, when I came here, I came here because it was something I'm supposed to be doing, but I left here a little bit differently...I left here saying that these people really love their countries. It's not a rip-off, and we're here to help them protect their country,”
Diplomatic success or shallow victory?
Allies kept Donald Trump on their side by focusing on his favorite subject - money, keeping discussions short, flattering the U.S. president, and personalizing the relationship with him, even at the expense of institutional substance. Member states agreed to increase defense and security-related spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, including 3.5% for core defense investments and 1.5% for adjacent costs like critical infrastructure, defense industry, and resilience. Spain was the only exception, not committing to the target.
Some Western media adopted Marco Rubio’s term “Trump Summit” and described the summit as a “Trump victory.” The White House issued a statement calling it a “monumental victory ” and referring to the “historic deal” to boost defense contributions, quoting praise for US President from world leaders, foreign ministers, and media outlets.
However, the personalization of the summit around Donald Trump came at the cost of meaningful discussions about shared security threats, especially Russia and the war in Ukraine.
What was missing from the final summit declaration?
In 2024, at the Washington summit, the allies intensely debated Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to NATO, accompanied by concrete measures. Previous summits included explicit references to Russia’s aggression in their final declarations. In 2024, it stated: “Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shattered peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and gravely undermined global security.” In 2025, the reference to Russia is vague and generic, within a broader context:
“United in the face of profound security threats and challenges, in particular the long- term threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security and the persistent threat of terrorism, Allies commit to invest 5% of GDP annually on core defence requirements as well as defence-and security-related spending by 2035 to ensure our individual and collective obligations, in accordance with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty.”
The 2024 final declaration also included references to the Black Sea, strategically important for Romania.
Last year, I wrote about the NATO Washington Summit:
“For Romania, the Washington Summit was a positive one. NATO’s Eastern Flank remains a central focus of the allies, given the war in Ukraine and the Russian threat. The inclusion of the Black Sea in the final communiqué for the second year in a row is a success for Romanian diplomacy. Euro-Atlantic security is directly tied to Black Sea security, and NATO cannot afford to lose the political and strategic battle for the Black Sea. What was once a peripheral space at the intersection of diverse geopolitical interests can, in time, become a ‘NATO sea’.”
None of this was included in 2025. In that regard, The Hague communiqué, with only four general paragraphs, is a step back from the Vilnius (2023) and Washington (2024) summits.
Resetting the Alliance
While flattering the U.S. president may have bought a “relief”, the alliance finds itself in a critical moment. NATO is headed toward a reset of its internal balance.
In reality, the U.S. is stepping back from its traditional leadership role within NATO. Behind the smiles and cordial atmosphere at The Hague, the “elephant in the room” remained the lack of trust in the current Washington administration, stemming from unpredictability and its apparent intent to disengage from Europe.
Increased defense spending is a positive step, but one born of necessity. Faced with new threats and the prospect of reduced American support, European states and Canada have no choice but to adapt. Not coincidentally, Canada and the European Union signed a “Partnership on Security and Defence” at their joint summit just before The Hague meeting.
Substantively, the Trump administration does not share the same view on security or on the Russian threat as its European partners. Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder describes the mood:
“Behind all the backslapping, broad smiles and bonhomie, though, it’s impossible to ignore the real concerns and fears that now fully penetrate the alliance… Unlike all his predecessors, Trump isn’t interested in burden-sharing. He wants burden-shifting. And as a result, Washington’s influence in and leverage over both NATO and Europe will steadily diminish.”
On the other hand, reaching the 3.5% target will be a challenge for many member states. Max Bergmann, a program director at the renowned U.S. think tank CSIS, cites the UK and France as examples where governments would have to cut health and social services.
“In most European countries, a politician who cuts health care for defense is faced with a huge political liability in their next election. This would create a political opportunity for large populist parties on the far-right and far-left to argue they are for “peace” and engagement with Russia in order to preserve national social services.”
Bergmann argues that member states failed to “achieve a substantive strategic shift” at The Hague. In his view, over time, the high spending target and the difficulty of reaching it could become a pretext for the current U.S. administration to distance itself even further from Europe.
The next NATO Summit will take place in Turkey. With the pace of global developments, it’s difficult to predict what the world will look like by then. NATO cleared a significant hurdle in The Hague, but major concerns remain.
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